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Chris Dockrill* Computer Data Banks and
Personal Information: Protection
Against Negligent Disclosure
I. Introduction
The common law has for centuries recognized the protection of certain
interests which fall under the rubric of what is commonly referred to as
the right of privacy.' While these safeguards have not always satisfied the
concerns of the aggrieved individual, they have and continue to afford
some measure of protection. The recognition of a need for a more specific
means of protecting such interests is more recent in origin, dating to the
later part of the last century.2
The concern for the privacy of the individual and the threatened
intrusion made possible through the advances of technology, specifically
that of electronic data-processing equipment (computers), is of even more
recent origin. Developments in technology have brought about
tremendous enhancement in the capabilities and an associated reduction
in the cost of such equipment. This coupled with the growth in the
volume and complexity of our everyday transactions, has given rise to a
phenomenal spread of such equipment throughout the world. The
inevitable result has been an ever-increasing impact on our daily
activities.
The spread of computers had grown from the installation of the first
few experimental models in the late 1940s and early 1950s to
approximately 300,000 world-wide by 1974. However, in the last dozen
years this number. has increased to approximately 48 million 3 individual
systems world-wide and is expected to continue at a similar pace for
some time.
* LL.B., University of Alberta.
1. For instance, the torts of trespass, nuisance, defamation and besetting have afforded
remedies to those who have felt that their sphere of privacy has been intruded upon.
2. See Godkin, Scribner's Magazine, July, 1890, at 65 and Warren and Brandeis, "The Right
to Privacy" (1890), 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193.
3. To place these numbers in perspective it must be remembered that until the early 1970s only
medium to large organizations could afford these devices. Through the development of new
technologies, particularly LSI (large scale integration) and VLSI (very large scale integration)
the physical size and cost associated with these devices have both dropped dramatically. These
numbers represent not only the multi-million dollar systems installed in public and private
sector organizations, but also the micro-computers with price ranges from under one hundred
dollars to ten or fifteen thousand dollars, which may be found in many homes today.
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Considerable attention has been paid by many writers to the impact of
these devices upon our individual and collective rights of privacy. We are
confronted daily with stories of threats which are posed by these intrusive
devices. Both the news and entertainment media fill our lives with reports
of actual and fictional occurrences which have stripped individuals of
their protective shield and exposed them to the scrutiny of others.
The majority of these scenarios focus upon deliberate efforts of
governmental agencies, cloaked within their administrative powers, to
amass and utilize more and more information concerning individuals, or
the illegal activities of individuals or organizations in acquiring access to
similar information. Major concern has been focused upon intentional
acts and their threat to the privacy of the individuals involved. Typical
examples of such occurrences include:
(a) proposals within the United States during the early 1970s for the
establishment of a National Data Centre;4
(b) the U.S. federal "Project Match",5 under which the welfare rolls of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare are matched to
federal payroll files6 in an attempt to catch federal employees who
were defrauding the welfare system;
(c) discovery,7 by the Canadian federal government, of suspected tax
evaders, and welfare and unemployment insurance cheaters
through the computer matching of benefit payment records against
records of employment and separation from employment, provided
to the government for the purposes of administering various
programs;
(d) the U.S. Department of Defence discovery of a discrepancy of
186,000 individuals, when they matched drivers license registration
for 18-year-old males with draft registration files.
Throughout the literature, the shared concern appears to be about the
growth in governmental powers in this area and the widespread
development of private organizations8 which collect and disseminate,
4. Such an undertaking would draw together all information concerning individuals held by
governmental agencies and would, through correlation and matching techniques, make
tremendous amounts of information available to those who had access to the files.
5. 43 Fed. Reg. 1135 (1978).
6. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld special treatment of federal civil servants
notwithstanding the constitutional guarantees of equal treatment before the law. Sea United
Public Workers v. Mitchell 330 U.S. 75 (1947) upholding restrictions on civil servants'
participation in political campaigns.
7. J. Sallat, "Computer sleuthing leads Ottawa to millions in jobless overpayments", Globe
andMall October 3, 1984.
8. Professor Miller speaks of the "information buddy system" whereby "the result is a
subterranean information exchange network that functions on a mutual backscratching basis or
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generally for a fee, both personal and financial information relating to
individuals.
While these may represent legitimate interests, they are not the only
matters with which we should concern ourselves. There is another less
obvious but equally threatening aspect of the invasion of privacy which
most often is totally ignored. This relates to breaches of confidentiality or
disclosures of information, not as the result of a deliberate effort of any
individual, but rather as a result of carelessness or negligence.
It is this aspect of the protection of privacy with which this paper is
concerned. It will address the sources of such breaches or invasions, the
remedies or relief available to those who are affected and will attempt to
assess the current provisions for protecting against such occurrences. It
will conclude with recommendations to ensure a greater measure of
protection of the right of privacy of the individual.
I. Legitimate Rights of Data Access
Privacy has been seen as a right which must, to a certain extent, be
surrendered in return for social benefits.9
There can be no doubt that, faced with the nature and complexity of our
daily activities, we have no alternative but to accept the presence of
computers in our lives. Even the most adamant critics of the intrusion of
computer systems must recognize the need for both private and public
sector organizations to employ computers in the storage and processing of
the information which is essential to their effective operation. Without
the speed and economies of computer processing, the provision of many
goods or services would be impossible or, at best, far more expensive.
If business organizations are going to extend credit, they must have the
right to check the credit history of applicants. If government agencies are
to use public funds, in the best interests of the public, they must have
access to means of detecting and preventing fraud and abuse of their
programs.
The legitimate use of such facilities has therefore become a recognized
feature of our daily lives. The credit bureau files, department store
accounts, our banking records, government files concerning every aspect
of our lives, are all computerized. We accept this as a natural state of
affairs. And so we should, so long as we are confident that these files
contain accurate and timely information, nothing which is not relevant to
can be invoked for a fee". ("Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview",
[1972] 4 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. I at 10).
9. S.J. Toope and A.L. Young, "The Confidentiality of Tax Returns under Canadian Law"
(1982), 27 McGill L.J. 479 at 482.
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the purpose for which they are maintained and that their contents are not
disclosed to unauthorized individuals.
The objective of maintaining any file, whether manual or mechanized,
is to serve some specific purpose. This purpose is generally to facilitate or
prevent the occurrence of certain events. For instance, credit bureau files
are ostensibly maintained to lessen the likelihood of individuals abusing
the credit-granting system. Experience has shown that, even with
computerized reporting systems, some abuses do occur.10 The effect of
such situations is an increase in costs to all consumers to cover these
losses. Similarly, government programs must be monitored to ensure that
abuses are prevented.
In order to achieve those ends, organizations must collect, store and
utilize large volumes of information concerning the citizens with whom
they deal. As a consequence of these activities, individuals who are
employed by these organizations become privy to such information in the
course of their employment.
'these specific uses of information generally do not cause alarm unless
a breach occurs. This information can, if used in other ways, create
greater exposure for the individuals concerned. Examples of activities or
proposals which have caused alarm include:
(a) a proposal to amend the Alberta Public Health Act to permit the
disclosure of confidential information about persons with
communicable and sexually transmitted diseases when it is in the
public interest;
(b) examination of confidential medical records in an effort to catch
doctors who may be cheating the Ontario Health Insurance Plan;"
(c) a proposal by the federal Solicitor General to give the new civilian
security agency access to medical records to assist in their
protection of national security;12
(d) the introduction of new legislation in Alberta to compel public
agencies and individuals to release, to a court or designated
individual, any information concerning the whereabouts of anyone
who is delinquent in maintenance payments; 13
(e) attempts by Revenue Canada to obtain confidential information on
clients from a commodities futures market broker;14 and
10. "Couple proved foreclosure not always financial suicide", Calgary HeraI4 June 18, 1984.
11. Public Health Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-27.
12. "Let spy-catchers use medical data: Kaplan", Globe andMall May 23, 1984.
13. "Support payment reforms ahead", Edmonton Journal July 9, 1984. See Maintenance
Enforcement Act, S.A. 1985, c. M-0.5.
14. James Richardson and Sons Ltd v. M.N.R., 84 D.T.C. 6325 (S.C.C.), rev'g 82 D.T.C.
6204 (E,A.D.), affg 81 C.T.C. 229 (E,T.D.).
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(f) a proposal for the establishment of a computerized prescription
registration system to curtail illicit drug trade in narcotics. 15
These and countless other activities pose an even greater threat to the
virtually non-existent rights of privacy.
III. Nature of the Breach or Invasion
Computers do not invade privacy. They are merely instruments which,
when employed by their skillful and sometimes devious users, make
possible the intrusion upon or invasion of the privacy of others. It must
be remembered that it is the individuals behind these machines who are
the source of that intrusion.
Notwithstanding the general level of awareness of computers among
the public, there are still many misconceptions which abound. One of
these, perhaps even fortified by the awareness of and experience with
micro-computers, is the false impression of the use and operation of large
computer systems.
The belief that the system is operated and controlled by one or two
individuals who have control of the "big button" which gives them access
to all of the computers' secrets is far from reality. The operation of
computer systems involves many individuals, with large organizations
typically having hundreds of staff employed exclusively in some facet of
its data-processing activities. Accordingly, any or all of these individuals
may, to some degree, have access to the information which is processed
and stored by these computer systems. These individuals may be engaged
in any number of activities, including preparation and entry of the data
for processing by the computers; creation of the programs which perform
the processing functions; operation of the hardware and its peripheral
components; or even the delivery of printed reports produced by the
computer to the users of such information. Ironically, those who operate
the computer hardware often have the least access to the data which it is
manipulating. It is the users of that information, scattered throughout the
organization, who have the greatest access.
There is also a general misconception of the level of security
surrounding the accessibility of information which is stored by
computers. Most people are familiar with the security measures which
are utilized within the data-processing environments. We hear of cipher
15. "Doctor-shopping drug scam on increase", Edmonton Journal June 25, 1985. Sec:
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) where a similar scheme was found not to be an undue
invasion of privacy since access was limited to appropriate officials. This program has been
developed and has resulted in the detection of patients and physicians suspected of abusing
controls on certain drugs.
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locks on the physical premises of data centres, cryptic passwords which
are employed by authorized users to identify themselves to the computer
before it will permit access to its resources and data encryption
techniques which are used to render useless any data which falls into the
hands of unauthorized individuals. But in spite of all these precautions,
breaches do occur.
The old adage that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link is most
appropriate in this regard. One writer has stated:
... if you walk into a hospital you will often find case notes lying around.
It would be an easy matter to pick them up and read them. The security
of the information held in a computer is much greater.' 6
While this observation is entirely accurate, it perhaps ignores a major
aspect of the use of the computers for information processing and storage.
There is no value in merely storing information. It is stored so that it may
be later retrieved and used for some constructive purpose. The two main
ways in which such information is retrieved is either through display on
a video terminal or via a hardcopy printer. In the first instance, the
information is temporarily displayed 7 and, once the image leaves the
screen, is no longer accessible unless displayed in response to another
authorized request. In the latter instance, the information remains on the
printed page, accessible to anyone who may gain access to that piece of
paper, until it is destroyed. Information stored in computers can also take
other forms. Computer Output Microforms (COM) is a common method
for handling such information. A number of recent incidents of
unauthorized disclosure of information, involving microfiche, highlights
the vulnerability of such information sources.
We, as users of these sophisticated computer systems, tend to stress the
"high-tech" security measures yet often overlook the obvious sources of
potential compromise of data security.
Consider the following scenarios:
(a) A computer programmer has just completed the development of a
new system (series of computer programs) which, when in operation, will
process the accounts receivable for a business concern. As the last step in
the development of the system, the programmer must thoroughly test the
programs. To provide the data for this test, he sits down with the local
16. N. McIntyre, "Medical Records: Computers and the Patient" (1982), 50 Medico-Legal J.
159 at 165.
17. Some systems are designed to display the requested information until a subsequent request
is made by the user. In such instances it is possible that a particular display may be left on the
screen for an extended period of time.
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telephone directory and pulls names and addresses at random 8 using
these as the basis of his test data. After running his tests, he discards the
results, which somehow fall into the hands of someone who knows one
of the individuals who appears on this list and tells the test subject that
he is surprised to see that that individual has such a bad credit record.
(b) The same circudmstances occur as above, except in this instance the
programmer uses real data from the organization's files. 19
(c) An individual employed by Revenue Canada (or for that matter any
other agency having access to income tax files20) is curious about the
income level of a prominent citizen in the community, a sports celebrity
or a friend. He looks at the file which he normally would have no need
to reference.
(d) A copy of a credit rating report is found lying in an alley next to the
garbage bin of a commercial credit bureau.21
(e) Through an error in processing, the computer system of a credit-
reporting agency provides erroneous data concerning an applicant for
credit. As a result, the applicant is refused and suffers humiliation and
embarrassment.
While each of the foregoing examples represents a potential intrusion
into the privacy of the individual or individuals involved, they are only
a small part of the number of similar activities which occur daily.
Characteristic of each of these scenarios is the absence of malice22 on the
18. This is a very common practice in the data-processing community. While working as a
systems analyst for a provincial government department during the late 1960s, a colleague
seriously jeopardized his career through a similar practice. He was working on a public health
system and chose the names of the management and staff of the office in which he worked. He
made the further mistake of leaving the results of his tests on his desk to be seen by all who
wandered by. Needless to say, his supervisor was not amused by the combination of venereal
diseases which had been attritubed to him in this test data.
19. Since this is only a test there is likely to be little concern about the disposal of the results.
20. The McDonald Commission inquiry into the R.C.M.P. uncovered the fact that Revenue
Canada routinely gave tax information to the R.C.M.P., although they had no legal right to do
so without following established procedures. Laycraft J. of the Alberta Bench, in his inquiry
into the operations of Royal American Shows Inc., pointed to the ineffective definitions
regarding the provisions of confidentiality of tax return information in s. 241 of the Income
Tax Act
21. Documents, including computer printouts of savings and chequing accounts for credit
union customers, and some papers containing personal information about the character of
borrowers, were found outside a building in Winnipeg once owned by the Credit Union
Stabilization Fund. See "Scramble for documents left in bin", Edmonton Journal June 3,
1984. See also "Farm records found in garbage", Edmonton Journal June 30, 1984.
22. In The Assault on Privacy (infra, note 61), at p. 33 Professor Miller states:
Unthinking people are as capable of injuring others by unintentionally rendering a
record inaccurate, losing it, or disseminating its contents to unauthorized users as are
people acting out of malice or for personal aggrandizement.
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part of the perpetrator and generally a situation where authorized access
to the information in question did exist. It is this type of careless or
negligent invasion of the privacy of others which poses just as great, and
perhaps an even more prevalent threat to privacy than is evident from the
deliberate acts of those who seek to intrude.
In response to a federal task force study questionnaire,2 nearly one-
third of the organizations which responded admitted that they did not
employ any procedures or rules for disposal of data after its usefulness to
the organization had passed.
The obvious questions which should arise in regard to each of these
scenarios concerns whether or not citizens are protected against such
breaches of or intrusion into their privacy. With some minor exceptions,24
Canadian courts, unlike their U.S. counterparts, have not recognized a
specific right of privacy. The next section of this paper explores this
situation to determine the extent to which the right of privacy does exist
in Canadian jurisdictions.
IV. The Right of Privacy in Canada
Unlike the strong U.S. experience,25 the Anglo-Canadian common law
tradition does not recognize a general right of privacy.26 Although some
statutory provisions exist in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba,
Quebec and Newfoundland, 27 not all provinces have seen fit to follow
their lead. However, even those provinces which furnish a measure of
statutory protection impose limitations on the protection which is
afforded and the remedies that are available. 28. Accordingly, those
seeking legal protection of their privacy must look elsewhere and can
expect varying treatment before the law, depending upon their place of
residence.
23. Privacy and Computers, Report by The Department of Communications/Department of
Justice 1972; question 20.A.5 at p. 214.
24. Capan v. Capan (1980), 14 C.C.L.T. 191 (Ont. H.C.); Saccone v. Orr (1981), 34 O.R.
(2d) 317, 19 C.C.L.T. 37 (Co. CL). See also: Motherwell v. Motherwell (1977), 1 A.R. 47, 73
D.L.R. (3d) 62 (C.A.).
25. The recognition of the general right of privacy is generally credited to the influence of the
Warren and Brandeis article, supra, note 2, followed by the first judicial recognition of such
a right in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68 (S.C. Ga. 1905) and later by cases such
as N.A.A.C.P v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26. See, eg., J. Williams, "Invasion of Privacy" (1973), 11 Alta. L. Rev. 1.
27. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 336; R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24; S.M. 1970, c. 74, S.N. 1981, c. 6; see also
Art. 1053 of the Quebec Civil Code
28. For example, both the B.C. and Saskatchewan statutes require willful conduct on the part
of the defendant while the Manitoba statute requires substantial and unreasonable conduct,
although none requires proof of damage to permit recovery. On this basis, in B.C. and
Saskatchewan, and perhaps even in Manitoba, recovery would be precluded, for negligent acts
regardless how outrageous the behavior was.
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Professor Prosser29 identified four distinct types of invasion:
1. intrusion upon the plaintiffs physical and mental solitude or
seclusion;
2. public disclosure of private facts;
3. publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
4. appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness.
This examination is concerned with categories 2 and 3 only. These
represent the class of activities which are evident in the examples cited in
the previous section. Both deal with the disclosure or publication of facts
or information concerning another individual. In numerous judgments,
the U.S. courts have held that the publication of personal or confidential
information, concerning another, is actionable whether under the head of
invasion of privacy ° or under some other cause of action, such as breach
of confidence,31 but have stopped short of affixing liability where that
which has been disclosed is already a matter of public record.32
What, then, is the Canadian stand on such matters? In the foregoing
examples of an invasion, by way of disclosure, the aggrieved party is not
entirely without remedy. The remedies which are available to that
individual include possible tort or contract actions as well as the
possibility of an action under a provincial or federal statute. We will
assess each of these alternatives in turn.33
1. Defamation
It is well accepted that an action for defamation will lie where the
defendant committed the act or acts complained of with no intention to
defame or where he had no knowledge of the plaintiff? 4
Therefore, the negligence of the defendant is sufficient to create liability.35
29. W.L. Prosser and J.W. Wade, Cases andMaterials on Torts, (5th ed. 1971) at 930.
30. Melvin v. Reid 112 Cal. App. 285; 297 P. 91 (4th Dist. C.A. 1931).
3 1. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat Bank, 83 Idaho 578; 367 P. (2d) 284 (1961).
32. Melvin v. Reid supra, note 30, Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330; 95 SE 2d 606
(So. Car. Sup. Ct. 1956).
33. This discussion of possible remedies is not intended to be definitive in scope. It is intended
to address some of the possible avenues of redress for the party who feels that his privacy has
been invaded or compromised. This coverage focuses upon the general applicability of each
remedy and its possible strengths and inherent limitations in addressing the needs of such
individuals.
Obviously, issues such as causation, remoteness, foreseeability and the interplay of defences
such as novus actus interviens play a major role in the success of any legal action which is
initiated in response to such intrusions into privacy. Due to the limitations of space, a more
detailed discussion of the individual elements of each remedy is not possible.
34. E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] A.C. 20 (H.L.).
35. Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers Limited [1929] 2 K.B. 331 (C.A.).
Computer Data Banks and Personal Information
Success in this regard is, however, tied to the proving of defamation and
not to the mere publication of the facts or information. This will require
that the facts complained of be shown to be:
... calculated to bring [the plaintiff] into hatred, ridicule or contempt...
or causes [him] to be shunned or avoided.36
It must be remembered, however, that the defendant may avail himself of
certain defences. Paramount among these is the defence of justification
(or truth).37 Therefore, it would seem that, for the plaintiff to succeed in
an action for defamation, the facts disclosed must be entirely fabricated
or sufficiently incorrect to satisfy the requirements of injury to the
plaintiff's reputation or standing in the community.38
It can be seen that there is some potential for redress in this area
although it will be limited by the circumstances of the publication or
disclosure of the information.
2. Breach of Confidence
An action for breach of confidence will likely give rise to several
problems. Foremost among these is the fact that the courts are prone to
limit this action to commercial relationships39 and require that an explicit
reliance has been established between the parties.40 The remedy in such
situations is generally limited to an equitable injunction, unless
substantial economic loss has been incurred. In many instances, the
courts have been reluctant to give relief even in the face of deliberate
disclosures of personal information.41
In establishing the action for breach of confidence, the plaintiff must
prove a reasonable expectation of privacy existed between him and the
defendant. The U.S. courts have been quite harsh in refusing to accept a
claim of reasonable expectation of privacy.42
36. Youssoupoffv. Metro-Goldwyn-MayerPicturesLtd (1934), 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A.).
37. Under the circumstances, availability of other defences such as consent is also significant.
38. Notwithstanding that under statute, in most jurisdictions, an action for defamation may
proceed without proof of damages, courts are likely to award successful plaintiffs nominal
damages unless substantial harm can be established: Murphy v. La March et al, [1971] 2
W.W.R. 196 (B.C.C.A.); affg. (1970), 73 W.W.R. 114 (B.C.S.C.).
39. Pre-Cam Exploration andDev. Ltd v. McTavish [1966] S.C.R. 551, where a constructive
trust was found to exist.
40. Deeks v. Wells, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 353 (P.C.)
41. Doe v. McMillan, 459 F. 2d 1304; rev'd inpart and affd inpart 412 U.S. 306 (1972).
42. See, eg.: United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Burrows v. Superior Court of San
Bernardino Count, 13 Cal. 3d 238; 529 P. 2d 590 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974) and Charnes v.
DiGiacomo, 612 P. 2d 1117 (Col. Sup. Ct. 1980). The U.S. Congress responded to the decision
in US. v. Miller by passing the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 340 Supp.
111978) which has given at least a limited measure of protection (Hancock v. Marshall 86
ER.D. 209 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1980).
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As with the action for defamation, the likelihood of a plaintiff
succeeding under this head is remote unless there exists a verbal or
written agreement, between that individual and the data base owner,
which gives an assurance of privacy, sufficient to cover any of these
situations. Given the relative bargaining strength of governmental and
commercial establishments in their dealings with the public, it is highly
unlikely that such an undertaking would ever exist.
Breach of confidence should not be ruled out without some
consideration, but, as one writer has stated:
.. in as much as the action of breach of confidence has served to protect
knowledge, attributes and information, it does not logically give rise to a
good argument supporting privacy in the sense of protecting the sensibility
and dignity of the individual.43
3. Negligence
Unless the plaintiff can show tangible evidence of damages (Le., loss of
employment or injury to financial standing) the likelihood of recovery
under this cause of action is virtually non-existent. The plaintiff must also
establish negligence, with the particularly difficult task of showing the
existence of a duty of care. Even where a statutory duty of non-disclosure
exists,44 in light of the Supreme Court decision in In Right of Canada v.
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 45 it is unlikely that any successful action may
be brought unless a duty can also be shown to exist at common law.
The strongest arguments for finding the requisite duty of care will no
doubt arise in those circumstances where the complainant is participating
in a non-volitional capacity or where express or impled contractual terms
of non-disclosure may be found to exist.
Given the state of the art in data-processing technology, and the
individual's general inability to be familiar with the techniques and
procedures employed by large organizations, there is a strong case to be
made for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This will be
particularly true where there is any suggestion of the "problem" arising
from a computer software error.
In the absence of inside information, it will be virtually impossible for
a plaintiff to identify specific acts of negligence which are the basis of the
claim being asserted. A plaintiff could experience difficulty in attempting
to prove negligence without a detailed knowledge of the intricacies of the
offending organization's information-processing systems. Because of the
43. Glasbeck, "Limitations on the Action of Breach of Confidence", in Gibson, ed., Aspects
of Privacy Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 227.
44. See, eg. s. 241 of the Income TaxAc R.S.C. 1952, c. 148.
45. [1983] S.C.R. 205
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concern for the potential vulnerability of their information resources,
most organizations have taken precautions to limit access to and
knowledge of their information-processing facilities. Often, the nature of
some acts is such that there is no tangible evidence of negligence. If the
circumstance arose from an error in a computer program, the plaintiff
will, no doubt, experience difficulty in gaining access to that program. If
he does succeed, the error will likely have been corrected and no trace
will have been left. Often, the nature of the problem itself is such that
evidence of negligence is destroyed by the computer system.46 Since
much of this information is recorded in electronic form, it is readily
destroyed without any trace.
Where all such information is in the sole possession of the defendant,
and it is highly probable that the problem arose from the negligence of
the defendant, it is unjust to merely permit the defendant to demur or
insist that the plaintiff provide more specific allegations.47 It must not,
however, be assumed that res ipsa loquitur applies automatically in all
instances where advanced technology is employed. Obviously, the
requirements set out in the case law since Byrne v. Boadle8 must be
satisfied.
4. Conversion
A more controversial action would be one for conversion. Again the
question of a non-deliberate act may arise, but this is no bar to an action
for conversion.4 9 Similarly, the fact that the disclosure arose from a
negligent act does not preclude liability attaching to the defendant.
In any action for conversion relating to disclosure of information, there
are two major hurdles to overcome. The first relates to whether the law
recognizes property rights in information which are worthy of protection,
and the second, to the concept of the ownership of the data or
information.
(a) Property in Information
The courts have long struggled with the question of whether or not there
is property, worthy of legal protection, in information. As early as 191850
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a quasi-property interest in news
46. Siegler v. Kuhlman 502 P. 2d 1181 at 1185 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1972).
47. Nealv. US., 402 . Supp. 678 at 680 (D.N.J. 1975).
48. (1893), 2 H. & C. 722; 159 E.R. 299 (Ex. Ct.).
49. Hollins v. Fowler (1975), 44 L.J.O.B. 169; 33 L.T. 73.
50. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Ironically, Justice
Brandeis, who co-authored the seminal article on privacy with Samuel Warren, dissented in
this judgement.
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reports which had been copied by a competitor. Subsequent decisions
also have recognized property rights in materials such as bank records.51
It is important to consider the Canadian courts' treatment of this
subject in recent years. In the Ontario High Court, Krever, J., in R. v.
Stewart,52 ruled that confidential information is not property for the
purpose of the law of theft. He reasoned that there must be some
deprivation of the public or some individual of something of value. In this
instance the accused had been charged with counselling theft contrary to
s. 422 of the Criminal Code. It was alleged that he had importuned an
employee to obtain a copy of the names of all the staff of the
Constellation Hotel in Toronto. The information was to be used in an
attempt to unionize the staff. As taking a copy did not deprive the hotel
of its original property, Mr. Justice Krever concluded that no theft had
occurred and therefore no crime had been committed.
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the judgement and entered a
conviction53 against the respondent. In doing so the court did not
challenge the logic of Krever's J. finding. Rather, as stated by Houlden J.,
the court held:
While clearly not all information is property, I see no reason why
confidential information that has been gathered through the expenditure of
time, effort and money by a commercial enterprise for the purposes of its
business should not be regarded as property and hence entitled to the
protection of the criminal law.54
To sum up, I am of the opinion that the confidential information of its
employees compiled by the Constellation Hotel was property... 55
Cory J. concurred:
Lists compiled for business purposes fall within the term "literary works"
and they are a proper subject-matter for copyright.56
While the reference to copyright protection may be obiter, there can be
no mistake that this judgment is, for the time being, limited in application
to commercial environments and the commission of criminal offences. As
a result, the application of the principle of property in information to a
tortious action in conversion, while an intriguing case to argue, may not
be well received by the courts.
51. Brexv. Smith, 146 A. 34 (N.J. Ct. Ch. 1929).
52. R. v. Stewart(1982), 38 O.R. 89; 68 C.C.C. (2d) 305 (H.C.).
53. 1. v. Stewart (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 225; 5 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (C.A.).
54. (1983), 42 O.R. (2d) 255 at 236.
55. Id, at 240.
56. Id, at 244.
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It is worth noting, in passing, that Mr. Justice Lacourciere wrote a
rather compelling dissent in which he emphasized the statement of
Krever J. at trial:
It is not for a court to stretch the language used in a statute dealing with
the criminal law, to solve problems outside the contemplation of the
statute57
He noted that Parliament was considering proposals58 to extend the
definition of property in the Criminal Code to expressly include computer
data and software.
While this latter fact may improve the level of protection afforded to
information stored within computer systems, it does not adequately
address the issue of an individual's right to protect information
concerning himself.
The Stewart case is now before the Supreme Court of Canada. While
the outcome of the case may have little real impact on Mr. Stewart, (he
received an absolute discharge when he appeared before Krever J. for
sentencing, after the Court of Appeal handed down the guilty verdict),
many individuals expect this case to establish new law. One must not lose
sight of the significance of Krever's J. comments, cited above. The role of
the judiciary is to interpret and apply the law, not to make the law. That
responsibility lies with our elected members of Parliament or provincial
legislatures, as appropriate.
In 1985, the federal Parliament amended the Criminal Code
(ss. 301.2, 387) and created a new series of offences. These new offences
related to the unauthorized use of computers or computer-based data.
While these provisions cover a previously identified gap in the Criminal
Code,59 it is submitted that they do not automatically address the issue
which arises in the Stewart case. Somewhat ironically, the scenario would
be covered if the data or information were in "computer-processable"
form. However, if it is merely recorded on paper, it appears not to be
protected by these provisions. A stealthy and cautious individual could
avoid the sanctions by carefully accessing the information at the
appropriate point.
The issue which remains to be addressed relates to the value of
information, regardless of its form or format of storage. If information is
worthy of protection, it is worthy in all forms. It is submitted that this is
the basic issue, not whether "computer-processable" information
57. Id, at 230.
58. Bill G 667, 1st Session, 32nd Parl., 1980-81-82.
59. R. v. McLaughlin, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 331; 23 A.R.Z 30; kf'g. (1979), 19 A.R. 368; 51
C.C.C. (2d) 243 (C.A.).
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deserves protection. Considerable unnecessary problems could be
avoided, including the need for our courts to struggle with such issues, if
our legislators were more proactive and less reactive in their approach.
(b) Ownership
The plaintiff's case for ownership of information regarding himself is
perhaps stronger where the defendant has misappropriated it (Le., where
it has not been given willingly by the plaintiff). Accordingly, his case
would be much stronger in those instances where the individual involved
(the programmer in our examples) had merely culled it from the
telephone directory or other similar sources. However, in those instances
where the information arose from public sources, like telephone
directories, the courts would likely be hesitant to recognize the plaintiff's
right to claim an exclusive interest in the information.60 It has been
suggested6' that we might want to consider information about ourselves
in the same light as a picture and accordingly seek the same protection for
data that we afford under the action for appropriation, for gain, of the
likeness or image of another. Any such attempt would, however, be
administratively untenable and impossible to live with.
The cases which have been decided in this area (Le., ownership of
data) tend to support the concept of ownership in the individual who has
expended energy in its collection. 62 This unfortunately weakens the case
for the victim of the disclosure.
5. Mental Suffering or Nervous Shock
In the majority of circumstances arising from the factual situations being
addressed here, the injury complained of will not involve any physical
harm to the complainant, nor to his or her property. In most instances the
harm will be limited to the distress and embarrassment arising from the
revelation of what are considered private facts concerning that
individual.63
Traditionally, the courts have been hesitant to award compensation for
mental suffering, particularly in the absence of any physical harm.64
60. See: Melvin v. Reid supra, note 30.
61. A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy, (The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1971).
62. Seagerv. Copydex Ltd., [196712 All E.R. 415 (C.A.).
63. See Prosser's second category, supra, note 29. It is possible, however, that a complainant
may have suffered economic loss. This may arise where the plaintiff has incurred costs or lost
the benefit of a transaction as a result of the defendant's negligent release of the information.
Cf. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985).
64. Wilkinson v. Downtown, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57; Abramzik v. Brenner (1967), 65 D.L.R. (2d)
651 (Sask C.A.); Bourhill v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92 (H.L.).
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There has been some lessening of this practice, particularly in Ontario, in
regard to wrongful dismissal cases.65 There may also be problems
associated with establishing causation and foreseeability of the harm. It
should be noted, however, that if such a cause of action can be
established, recovery need not be limited by the lack of physical damage
or loss. Canadian courts have generally not accepted the restriction of
Rookes v. Barnara66 Accordingly, it may be possible for a plaintiff to
argue for substantial exemplary damages, in Lord Devlin's words,
"whenever it is necessary to teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay."67
This will depend upon showing outrageous behavior, or neglect, on the
part of the defendant.
One basis for mounting an argument in favour of an embarrassed
plaintiff may be based upon § 46 of the Restatement of Torts, Second
which specifies:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress...
While the Restatement is merely a guideline to United States law,
Canadian jurists often look to such sources in difficult circumstances.
Admittedly, the scenarios being discussed here are unlikely to fit the
requirements of the established law. However, given the paucity of
protection afforded to such plaintiffs it is necessary for their legal agents
to seek out imaginative arguments in support of their protection.
6. Breach of Contract
Much of the information provided to others occurs in the context of
business transactions between the parties. It will be rare to find express
contractual protection for the confidentiality of such information,
particularly considering that the transaction generally occurs under terms
and conditions specified by the recipient of such information.68 Where
such terms do exist, an action for breach of a contractual term is
appropriate.
65. Cf.: Pilon v. Peugeot Can. Ltd (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 378; 29 O.R. (2d) 711 (Ont.
H.C.); Pilato v. Hamilton Place Convention Centre Inc. (1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 342 (Ont.
H.C.). See also: Jarvis v. Swan Tours Ltd, [1973] 1 Q.B. 233; [1973] 1 All E.R. 71 (C.A.).
66. [19641 A.C. 1129 (H.L.).
67. Id., at 1227.
68. Tenants, employees, bank depositors, taxpayers and applicants for government benefits
must generally comply with the demands of the other party or forgo the transaction. The lack
of voluntariness of customers in supplying information to banks played a key role in the
suppression of such evidence obtained from the bank in Burrows v. Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, 529 P. 2d 590 (Calif. S. Ct. 1974).
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Absent express provisions, or in the face of limitation of liability,
waiver of liability or liquidated damages clauses, a potential plaintiff is
not without redress. The courts have struck down such limiting
provisions but in recent years, only where oppressive 69 or unconsciona-
ble behavior has been exhibited. It is submitted that plaintiffs will have to
show that they were placed in a position where they had no option but
to accept the other party's one sided conditions. Even in such instances,
courts are likely to rely upon the principle of freedom to contract (or not
contract).
Another possibility arises from the courts' willingness to imply
contractual terms of non-disclosure in certain relationships. The keystone
case in this area is Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of
England.70 The plaintiff was the recipient of a cheque from another
customer of the same bank with which he dealt. Rather than paying the
funds into his account, he endorsed the cheque to a third party. When the
cheque was cleared through the bank, the manager made enquiries
through the bank in which the cheque had been deposited. Upon being
informed that the endorsee was a bookmaker, the manager disclosed this
information to the plaintiffs employer. The plaintiff was dismissed and
brought an action for breach of an implied contractual term of
confidentiality. It appears that the bank manager was motivated by the
fact that the plaintiff had ceased to make the agreed-upon installment
payments on the overdraft in his account. On appeal, of a judgment in
favour of the respondent, the court ordered a new trial and indicated that
the bank owed a qualified duty of non-disclosure to its clients. Bankes
L.J. stated that disclosure on "a reasonable and proper occasion" was
permissable only when compulsion by law, duty to the public, the
interests of the bank, or express or implied consent of the depositor
warranted. 71
Tournier was followed in Hull v. Childs and The Huron and Erie
Mortgage Corporation72 Gale J. held that the institution had breached its
implied duty of non-disclosure but did not give judgment against the
defendant because the loss was not caused by this breach.73
Tournier suggests a judicial concern for the protection of the client's
financial interests. Whether such a duty can be extended to protect the
dignity and privacy of the individual is untested and therefore uncertain.
69. See Dickson J.'s comments, as he then was, in Elsley v. JG. Collins Ins. Agencies Ltd.
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 916 at 937.
70. [1924] K.B. 461 (C.A.).
71. Id, at 473.
72. [1951] O.W.N. 116 (H.C.). See also: Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 408 A. 2d 758 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
73. As noted previously, issues such as causation and remoteness may be significant.
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7. Breach of a Fiduciary Obligation
In a fashion similar to the imposition of implied terms of good faith and
fair dealing in contracts, equity imposes a number of obligations upon
those who are placed in a fiduciary relationship relative to others.
Whether such a relationship and its concommitant duties are sufficient to
protect the interests which this paper addresses is uncertain. Obviously,
this avenue of redress will be open only where the relationship in
question is one to which a fiduciary obligation attaches.
From a review of the case law, it would appear that personal or
confidential information may be afforded some measure of protection. In
Re Londonderry's Settlement,74 Salmon L.J. held that a beneficiary has a
proprietary interest in trust documents. In Re Smith,75 McRuer C.J.
found that a beneficiary's interest in information relating to the trust was
based upon his proprietary interest in the res of the trust. In both
instances, the issue before the court was the beneficiary's right to inspect
trust documents. Both cases held that the cestui que trust has such a right,
but that a trustee has the right to withhold information relating to the
trhstee's discretionary powers so as not to render the duty of
administration impossible. While both of these cases stand for the
proposition that a beneficiary has a right of access, they do not
automatically equate to a right of privacy. This principle will require
persuasive argument.
The existence of a proprietary interest worthy of protection appears to
be a critical element in finding judicial support for protection against
disclosure. While protection flowing from a fiduciary relationship may be
limited, there is still the possibility that the court may be persuaded that
such protection is warranted. This may require demonstrating to the
court that disclosure has placed or could place the claimant in financial
or emotional jeopardy. It is also worth noting that there is judicial
recognition of the fact that the categories of cases, and the nature of the
relationships, which will give rise to fiduciary obligations are not closed.76
Fiduciary obligations will attach to a number of relationships where
individuals or organizations possess or control information concerning
others. These include dealings with banks or other financial institutions,
lawyers, financial advisors, corporate officers and some public officials.
Whether or not the plaintiff can fit his situation into the technical
requirements of a fiduciary relationship will depend upon the specific
74. [196413 All E.R. 855 (C.A.).
75. [1952] O.WN. 62 (H.C.).
76. Cf: Laskin v. Bache & Co. Inc., [1972] O.R. 465; 23 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.); Evans v.
Anderson (1977), 3 A.R. 361; 76 D.L.R. (3d) 482 (C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused
(6 A.R. 270).
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circumstances. A basic element of this relationship requires that one party
be placed in the position of dealing with the interests of another in
confidence and with scrupulous good faith and candor. There would be
a much stronger legal argument to be advanced if judicial recognition of
personal information as an asset existed. In the absence of this vital factor,
a plaintiff may be limited to those situations where the disclosure of
information occurred in the course of dealing with other assets. Since
many individuals in the business community do not recognize the true
value of information as an asset, it should not be surprising to find limited
legal recognition.
Even where the action succeeds, the scope of available equitable
remedies may be somewhat limited in dealing with the type of breach
that is likely to arise. For instance, injunctive relief will be of no benefit
after the fact and therefore will be limited to suppression of such
disclosures when they are known in advance. 77
Similarly, remedies such as accounting, tracing and the use of a
constructive trust all require a proprietary interest which, as previously
indicated, may not exist in the information which is the subject of
concern.
8. Strict Liability Under Rylands v. Fletcher
In 1868, the House of Lords held that certain conduct, whether or not it
was wrongful per se, was so unusual in a particular community, or
attracted such a level of danger, that the risk of harm to others should be
borne by the individual who engaged in that conduct. 78
On any traditional analysis of the principle set out in this case it would
be impractical to consider the application of this doctrine to any of the
scenarios described earlier. The language of Rylands v. Fletcher, and
many of the cases which followed its ratio, speak in terms of dangerous, 79
ultra-hazardous 8 or abnormally dangerous8' activities and of non-natural
use of land82 and of "escape"83 from the land.
It would be ludicrous to suggest that the use of computer systems to
collect and manipulate data was a dangerous or non-natural use of land
per se. It must also be remembered that the principle of strict liability
77. Glover v. Bell Canada, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 563; 130 D.L.R. (3d) 382; affg. (sub nom. Glover
v. Glover(No. 2)) (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 401; 113 D.L.R. (3d) 174 (C.A.).
78. (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (H.L.).
79. Fletcher v. Rylands (1866), L.R. I Ex. 265,per Blackburn J.
80. Restatement of Torts, § 520 (1938).
81. Restatement of Torts, Second § 519 (1977).
82. Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, note 78 per Lord Cairns; Rickardsv.Lothian, [1913] A.C. 263
(P.C.).
83. Read v.J. Lyons& Co. Ltd, [1947] A.C. 156 (H.L.).
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developed in Rylands v. Fletcher is a variant of trespass and nuisance
actions, whose purpose is to protect property interests. Once again the
non-proprietary nature of information stands as a potential obstacle to
recovery.
Like so many other areas of the law, the strict liability doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher has been adapted to changing needs. In Canada the
principle is at best uncertain. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that
there is no necessity to prove unusual or non-natural use of land; a
showing of increased risk of harm is sufficient to establish liability under
Rylands v. Fletcher.84 A number of other decisions have reinforced this
position expressly or indirectly through avoidance of the use of the
traditional language.85 On the other hand, a number of cases have insisted
upon applying the literal interpretation of Rylands v. Fletcher and refused
to find liability in the absence of both non-natural use and escape.86
It is submitted that there is a credible argument to be made in support
of the application of the Rylands v. Fletcher principle to the negligent
disclosure of information from computer based information banks. In
most cases of unauthorized disclosure, there has been an "escape" of the
information. Whether it was through insufficient security precautions,
which led to unauthorized access, or carelessness in the handling and
disposal of information, the result has been the release or "escape" of
information. One need not look far to recognize the value of controlling
or manipulating information. In the early 19th century, large fortunes
were made by those who had advance knowledge of Napoleon's defeat
at Waterloo. Today, the incidence and the magnitude of insider trading
profits are astounding. It is surely time that we recognized the inherent
dangers associated with careless handling of information.
The computer systems and other mechanisms which speed our
information handling must be subjected to some means of control. These
facilities not only enhance our ability to process more information for
positive purposes, they increase our vulnerability to inappropriate
disclosure or use of information. This increased risk could provide the
basis for arguing application of the Rylands v. Fletcher principle.
It has long been accepted that the burden of increased risk should be
borne by the organization or individual who has created that risk. The
84. Crown Diamond Paint Co. v.Acadia Holding Realhy Ltd, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 161.
85. Bliss and Bliss v. Heimbecker and Barker (1982), 35 A.R. 280 (Q.B.); Newell v. R.E.
Newell Fisheries Ltd et aL (1982), 54 N.S.R. (2d) (SC.T.D.); Metson v. 1? W DeWolfe Ltd
(1980), 43 N.S.R. 221; 14 C.C.L.T. (S.C.T.D.).
86. Maron et aL v. R.A.E. Trucking (1981), 31 A.R. 216 (Q.B.); Lyon et aL v. Village of
Shelburne (1981), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Co. Ct.); but see: Fingas v. Summerfield Colony
(1980), 5 Man. R. 361 (C.A.).
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commercial value of the enterprise and the social responsibility of shifting
the burden to the creator of the risk is best demonstrated by the words of
Bramwell L.J.:
It is just and reasonable that if a person uses a dangerous machine, he
should pay for the damage which it occasions; if the reward which he
gains for the use of the machine will not pay for the damage, it is
mischievious to the public and ought to be suppressed, for the loss ought
not to be borne by the community or the injured person.87.
The inappropriateness or abnormal risk need not be associated with
the activity in question but may be related to the means employed in
carrying it out.88 But even where a court requires the use of the traditional
language, it could be demonstrated that the harm complained of was
caused by the escape of information and that there is a potential risk of
great harm associated with such occurrences.89
Given that the damages will generally be limited to emotional distress
or pure economic loss, it will be necessary to persuade the court that such
losses are recoverable under Rylands v. Fletcher principles.
It is expected that many courts may not be favourably disposed toward
the adoption of such an argument. However, it is only through the
innovative approaches of persuasive counsel that redress may be obtained
for an otherwise dissatisfied plaintiff. Furthermore, every legal principle
finds its origin or expansion in some innovative circumstance.
9. Statutory Protection
(a) General Provisions
Three of Canada's western provinces are seen as being in the forefront in
the passage of privacy legislation.9" Unfortunately, little if any progress
has been made since the passage of this legislation. Two other provinces
have followed the lead, but none of these provinces have updated their
legislation to reflect changes in technology and the associated changing
needs of our society.
One of the major criticisms of this legislation has been its lack of
specificity. For instance, the lack of definition of privacy in the B.C. Act9'
makes the nature of the right being protected somewhat vague. The
Manitoba and Saskatchewan Acts provide examples of violations92 but
do not provide any comprehensive definition of the right of privacy.
87. PowellandAnotherv. Fall [1880] 5 Q.B.D. 597 (C.A.) at 601.
88. Fingas v. Summerfeld Colony, supra, note 86.
89. Cf.: Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc, supra, note 63.
90. See note 27, supra
91. Atrens, "Comment on the Privacy Act", (1968) 26 Advocate 183.
92. Both ins. 3.
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Additionally, the B.C. and Saskatchewan Acts both require wilful
conduct93 and the Manitoba Act requires substantial and unreasonable94
behavior before an action may be brought.
All three of the Acts permit the bringing of an action without proof of
damage.95 The B.C. Act makes no reference to remedies. The Manitoba
legislation enumerates a number of factors to be considered in awarding
damages.96 Presumably, this allows judicial discretion in determining the
suitabilityof awarding punitive or exemplary damages and the possibility
of mitigation of damages, due to the actual status or behavior of the
plaintiff. The Saskatchewan Act leaves a fair degree of discretion to the
court in awarding remedies.97
Two additional interesting points to be noted regarding these statutes
are (a) the Saskatchewan Act specifically 98 binds the Crown, and (b) the
Manitoba Act precludes the admission into evidence in a civil proceeding
of any evidence obtained by virtue of a violation of privacy which could
be actionable under the Act.99
In summary, it may be concluded that while these statutory provisions
do provide a large measure of protection, which does not exist in other
provinces, they are not readily amenable to the protection of the interests
violated in our hypothetical examples (with the possible exemption of the
deliberate violation of the taxation information).
In each instance, the legislation requires deliberate acts on the part of
the violator. It is submitted that all of this legislation is directed at
protecting a limited sphere of privacy and that it does not contemplate
violations arising from careless or negligent behaviour. While it is wise to
avoid legislation which opens the proverbial floodgates of litgation, it is
important to recognize the need for additional safeguards for personal
privacy.
To illustrate the limited protection afforded by such legislation,
consider the case of Davis v. McArthur.'00 In this instance, the B.C. Court
of Appeal overturned a lower court finding that the actions of a private
investigator constituted a violation of the privacy of the complainant.
Tysoe J., speaking for the court, indicated that such a right was "[subject
to] the lawful interests of others"101, and that:
93. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 336, s. 1(1); R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24, s. 2.
94. S.M. 1970, c. 74, s. 2(1).
95. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 336,s. 1(1); R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24, s. 2; S.M. 1970, c. 74,s.2(2).
96. S.M. 1970, c. 74, s. 4(2).
97. R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24, s. 7.
98. Id, s. 11.
99. S.M. 1970, c. 74, s. 7.
100. (1969), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 250; rev'd(1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 760 (B.C.C.A.).
101. (1970), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 760 at 764-5.
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•.. as the agent of the wife who had a legitimate interest in her husband's
conduct ... the appellant was not in breach of the provisions of the
Privacy Act.102
No right is absolute; each is subject to limitations or qualifications. In
this instance, the court chose to recognize a qualified right to intrude
upon the privacy of the respondent. Without commenting on the merits
of this particular case, it must be recognized that limits must be imposed
upon all rights. The degree to which this is to be done, and who is to
make that decision, are difficult yet important issues. If we do not want
to have to resort to the courts every time one of these issues arises, we
must have more clearly articulated principles. This does not have to
imply more legislation, merely better legislation. If individuals are to
govern their behavior in accordance with the law, they must have a
reasonable opportunity of understanding what standards of behavior are
expected. Later in this paper, it will be proposed that we may want to
consider extending such rights to include protection against careless or
negligent acts that lead to a compromise of the privacy of another
individual.
(b) Specific Provisions
A general review of other legislation reveals a number of statutes, both
federal and provincial, which make provision for the protection of what
may be characterized as privacy interest. An exhaustive evaluation of
such provisions will not be attempted here. Instead, a review of some of
the provisions of representative statutes will be presented to demonstrate
the nature and extent of the protection afforded by such laws.
i. The Credit Reporting Agencies Act103
This statute provides for the licencing and filing of a bond by all persons
who intend to operate or act as a credit-reporting agency within the
province of Saskatchewan. It defines files in a very broad context as:
S. 2 (1)(d)... information about a consumer... regardless of how the
information is stored
thereby catching paper, as well as microform or magnetic media storage
as well as any new forms which may be developed (i.e., laser or fiber-
optic recording techniques).
Section 17 specifies that no agency will "knowingly divulge" the
contents of files to other than a specified class of individuals and s. 19
requires that "reasonable steps" be taken to assure the maximum
accuracy of information maintained. The consumer has a right under
102. Id, at 765.
103. R.S.S. 1978, c. C-44.
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s. 23 to know the contents of any file regarding him but is not entitled to
be informed of the sources of any investigative information in that file.
Additionally, under s. 25 a consumer has a right to challenge any
information in the file and, where the agency refuses to delete it, to have
attached to it, and any subsequent report, a statement setting forth the
nature of the dispute respecting the information. This is the only remedy
available to individuals under the Act. However, s. 30 provides for
penalties by way of fines or imprisonment for violations of the Act.
ii. Consumer ReportingAc4 197304
This Ontario statue is similar in form to the Saskatchewan Act except
that it has a few additional provisions. Section 8(4) specifies that the files
of a consumer reporting agency may not be sold, leased or the title
transferred, except to a consumer-reporting agency registered under the
Act. Section 11(1) ensures that consumers may access their files without
charge, but s. 11(2) allows the agency to withhold, from the consumer,
any medical information gained, with the consumer's consent, from a
physician who has specifically requested, in writing, that it be withheld
from the consumer in his own best interest.
Interestingly enough, the Act specifies, in s. 8(1), that operators and
employees of agencies must not "knowingly" furnish any information
from files to non-authorized recipients. However, s. 18(1), which deals
with those persons employed in the administration of the Act, provides
no such limitation. This potentially opens the door to an action in
negligent disclosure,105 providing such an action would be entertained by
the courts. However, the likelihood of unwarranted disclosure is much
greater with agencies than it is with government officials who administer
the Act.
iii. The Personal Investigations Act 10 6
S. 8(1) of this Manitoba statute limits a consumer's access to files to
once every six months, unless he has been notified of a denial of some
application for a benefit because of the contents of such a file. It also
provides for the establishment of fees to be paid by the consumer for the
inspection of his file. Sub-sections 11(2)and (3) provide for extra-
territoriality by making the Manitoba resident liable for compliance with
s. 11(1) of the Act where either the agency or the user of the information
is non-resident. This sub-section relates to the verification of disputed
information. In effect, whether a user or supplier of the information, the
104. S.O. 1973, c. 97.
105. S. 18(1) is a fairly strong argument for the recognition of a duty of care on the part of
those individuals.
106. S.M. 1971, c. 23.
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Manitoba resident bears the responsibility for verification when the other
party is a non-resident.
Perhaps the strongest statement in relation to our concern with
negligent disclosure is contained in s. 16, which states:
No user, personal reporter or personal reporting agency is civilly liable to
the subject of a personal report or personal file, unless the user, reporter or
agency, as the case may be is or ought to be reasonably aware that part or
all of the information in the report or personal file is false, or misleading,
or was obtained negligently. [Emphasis added]
This is surely a classic definition of negligence and thereby affords an
opportunity to advance an action, notwithstanding the prohibition on
"knowingly divulging" information referred to elsewhere 107 in the Act.
iv. Income Tax Act1M8
Section 241 of the Income Tax Act includes several provisions regarding
the communications of taxation information to non-authorized
individuals. S. 241(1)(a) sets the standard of "knowingly communicat-
ing" or "knowingly allowing" the communication and thereby precludes
the possible action for negligent disclosure if the Income Tax Act is to be
used as a source of a duty which has been breached. Until 1981, only
Revenue Canada staff or others defined as authorized individuals
committed an offence; an individual receiving the information did not.109
A change in 1981 created third party liability and thereby increased the
level of protection afforded to the taxpayer.
As previously mentioned,110 it has become apparent that there is no
general policy on disclosure, and wide discretionary powers appear to be
vested in the Minister and his officials. The department has invoked
s. 241(2) on occasion to refuse to identify the address of an absconding
husband who had taken his children after the court had awarded custody
to the wife1 or even denying release to the taxpayer of his own
records.112
The Act does provide for fines and/or imprisonment for violation but
civil remedies are limited to tortious actions against the specific
individual(s) involved.
107. Id, s. 5, s. 17(3).
108. R.S.C. 1952, c. 148.
109. Id., s. 241 (9)(b).
110. See Laycraft's J. comments regarding the Royal American Shows inquiry, supra, note
20.
111. Re Glover and Glover, [1980] C.T.C. 531 (Ont. C.A.); affd Glover v. M.N.R., [1981] 2
S.C.R. 561; 130 D.L.R. (3d) 383. More recent emphasis on maintenance order enforcement
processes has seen the legislation of information exchange between government agencies.
112. M.N.R. v. Die Plast Co. (1952), 6 D.T.C. 1082 (Que. C.A.).
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Given the secrecy which pervades the organization, and the refusal of
departmental staff to identify themselves, even in general correspondence
with taxpayers, it is highly unlikely that one who has suffered through an
unauthorized disclosure of his tax information will find redress.
As a footnote to the foregoing, it is interesting to note the growing
accessibility to federal tax records which is enjoyed by other federal and
provincial governmental bodies. For example, it is not uncommon for
other governmental agencies to tie the benefits of their programs to the
tax status of individuals and corporations.' 1 3 As part of the eligibility for
such government benefits, the taxpayer is obliged to give a written
authorization, to those agencies, which permits them access to the
taxpayer's tax files held by Revenue Canada. As accessibility spreads and
multiple copies of such information abounds, the likelihood of
unwarranted disclosures of such information increases. Given the
structure of the offences section (s. 241(a)) there is no application to
individuals or organizations who receive this information directly from
the taxpayer.
v. Access to Information Act 114
This federal statute is not concerned with the protection of privacy, but
rather with the granting of accessibility of information to the public. In
principle, it potentially legislates the removal of privacy for the individual
in regard to information held by federal government institutions. It does,
however, provide 15 for the non-disclosure of personal information
relating to individuals, subject only to the consent of the individual
involved, the public availability of the information or the provisions of
s. 8 of the Privacy Act." 6 In effect, this piece of legislation opens the door
to availability of information but potentially places many hurdles in the
path of those seeking access.
vi. Privacy Act" 7
This federal statute was enacted with the purported purpose of extending
the protection of privacy currently enjoyed by Canadians. It must be
remembered that it is limited in application solely to information which
is held by federal government institutions.
113. Eg., the Alberta Rental Investment Incentive Program.
114. S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 111, Schedule I (Section 1).
115. Id, s. 19(1).
116. Discussed infra
117. S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 111, Schedule II (Section 2).
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It contains many commendable provisions, particularly those
concerning the collection" 8 and disposal' 19 of information. For example,
s. 4 specifies that:
No personal information shall be collected by a government institution
unless it relates directly to an operating program or activity of the
institution.
S. 5 specifies that, wherever possible, information is to be collected
from the individual to whom it relates, and the organization shall, except
in specified circumstances, inform the individual that the information is
being collected. The two specified circumstances are where compliance
"might result in the collection of inaccurate information; or defeat the
purpose or prejudice the use for which the information is collected". S. 6
imposes an obligation on the institution to ensure the accuracy of its
information and addresses retention periods for the information being
held. It also contains laudable provisions regarding periodic publication
of indices' 20 of files held by government institutions, as well as those
concerning the complaint 21 and review'2 provisions involving the
independent Privacy Commissioner. The powers of the Federal Court to
review, 123 where access has been refused, and potentially order
disclosure'2 4 or removal' 25 of certain information are also spelled out.
These provisions are greatly overshadowed by some of the more
questionable aspects of the Act. Notable among these are the fact that the
only provision 26 regarding offences under the Act relates to obstruction
of the Privacy Commissioner, and the fact that, although the Privacy
Commissioner has the power to review all but very limited files,127 he has
no authority to order compliance. This office is limited to reviewing and
reporting only. Government officials are free to ignore the recommenda-
tions of the Privacy Commissioner with impunity. Also questionable is
the rather paternal nature of s. 28 relating to non-disclosure of medical
information 28 and s. 8(2)(b) which appears to give politicians and senior
118. Id, ss. 4-5.
119. Id, s. 6.
120. Id, s. 11.
121. Id, s. 29.
122. Id, s. 34-35.
123. Id, s. 41.
124. Id, s. 48.
125. Id, s. 50.
126. Id, s. 68.
127. Id, s. 34(2).
128. The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any personal information
requested under subsection 12(1) that relates to the physical or mental health of the individual
who requested it where the examination of the information by the individual would be
contrary to the best interests of the individual.
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government officials the power to abrogate any protection afforded under
this act.129
In conclusion, it would appear that, although there are significant
statutory protections in existence, they are limited in scope and do not
provide adequate coverage for the interests of the susceptible public.
There can be no question that those provisions which do exist afford little
or no safeguard in circumstances like those desribed previously in section
IL. Most of the legislation is limited to specific individuals, organizations
or types of business and invariably, with only minor exceptions, they
address themselves to deliberate acts of invasion or disclosure. Very little
protection exists when we are dealing with the many organizations, not
covered by such legislation, which collect and use large volumes of
information concerning members of the public.130
V. Control of Data Acquisition and Use
Perhaps the greatest fear of those who are concerned with invasion of
privacy is recognition of the fact that information supports power, and
consequently, any concentration of power in the hands of data collectors
could jeopardize the well being of the individual.
The question of regulation and control of computer-managed data
bases has gained great prominence among those who have expressed
concern about the potential threat posed to the privacy of the individual
by these technological marvels. Proposals for achieving some measure of
control have resulted in a diverse number of recommendations, each of
which has its apparent strengths and weaknesses. It must be accepted,
from the outset, that no single scheme or approach can hope to satisfy all
the competing interests and thereby bring about a balance between the
privacy of the individual and the legitimate needs of the data gatherers.
This section will review some of the most frequently identified
proposals for controlling computerized information handling. Each will
be discussed in terms of its approach and potential impact on the rights
of individuals.
129. S.8(2). Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the control
of a government institution may be disclosed
(b) for any purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any regulation made
thereunder that authorizes its disclosure.
130. With the possible exception of the general coverage offered by those provinces with
privacy legislation or where a complainant can fit himself within the parameters of some
specific tort action as described earlier in this section.
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1. Domestic Regulation
The obvious answer to any requirement for control is the establishment
of legislated rules governing activities or endeavors. Proposals and actual
implementations in this area have covered a vast range of possibilities.
The most usual is the establishment of legislation covering specific
industries such as those concerning credit-reporting agencies discussed in
the previous section. This approach has varied to the extent that
proposals have been advanced131 for compulsory registration, and
possibly licensing, of all systems which maintain personal data of any
form.
Under the U.K. Data Protection Act, 132 a system of compulsory
registration, guaranteed access and disclosure and formal review by a
Data Registrar is to be applied to all "automatically" processed
"personal" data. While the principle is commendable, one wonders if this
proposal does not go too far. Quaere whether this would apply to normal
business correspondence and, for that matter, legal documents not subject
to privilege, prepared on a word processor in a law office, notwithstand-
ing the appearance of exclusion of such information under s. 1(8) of the
Act.
Perhaps the most comprehensive data protection legislation to be
enacted to date is that of the Federal Republic of West Germany.133
Under s. 41 of this Act, any person who communicates, modifies,
receives or processes personal data, without authorization, is subject to
the imposition of a fine or imprisonment. Harsher penalties attach (Le.,
two year maximum sentence) if the unlawful access was for financial
gain. However, before any prosecution is undertaken, the citizen whose
information has been violated must be aware of the violation and must
complain to the authorities.
It has even been suggested that consideration be given to creation of a
specific tort to regulate computer technology. 134
2. Control of Transborder Data Flow
Considerable attention has been focused, in recent years, on the subject
of transborder data flow. For the most part, any regulation or proposals
131. See "Proposed Pennsylvania Privacy Bill Could Create Data Bank Chaos", I Computer
Law and Tax Report No. 1, Aug. 1974.
132. Royal Assent given 12 July 1984.
133. German Federal Data Protection Act of 1977 (Bundesgeselzblat) [BGBI] 1201.
134. G. Kaiser, "Constitutional Aspects of the Regulation of Canadian Computer
Technology" (1971), 1 Queen's L.J. 97. See: Chalos Systems Inc.v. National Cash Register
Corp., 479 F Supp 738 (D.N.J. 1979); and 635 E 2d 1081 (3rd Circ. 1980) where an
unsuccessful attempt was made to plead a new tort of computer malpractice.
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to date have tended to be more concerned with the protection of
domestic industry and the imposition of economic sanctions against non-
residents135 than with the protection of the privacy of individuals.
Even the guidelines of the Paris based O.E.C.D., concerning protection
of individuals from the misuse of computer stored information, caution
against the restriction of data flows across national borders.136 Canada
now subscribes to these guidelines.
While the establishment of international guidelines is a desirable
goal,137 it is feared that the persuasion of other member nations to open
their borders to a free flow of data will provide a further erosion of our
control over such information. It should be noted that there is a constant
flow of personal credit-related information, on Canadian citizens, to the
United States. The largest credit-reporting organizations are centered in
the southeastern U.S.
3. Licencing of Data Processing Personnel
Other proposals have called for the mandatory licencing of those engaged
in the data-processing field. This, in essence, represents a further
extension of the licencing practices currently in use in the credit-reporting
field. For such a scheme to be effective, it would necessitate the
establishment of minimum qualifications and certification standards for
personnel. This is something which the data-processing community has
been unable to accomplish to date due to the sheer size and diversity of
the field. It should be noted that advances are being made by industry
associations, but participation is strictly voluntary on the part of
individuals. This approach will ultimately improve the situation, but is
not sufficient to meet the needs which exist.
4. Industry Self-Regulation
Very comprehensive proposals for self-regulation of the data-processing
industry have been advanced.138 If the experience of other professions
such as law and medicine could be replicated in this regard, this could be
part of the answer. However, due to the varied educational backgrounds
and diverse roles of the individuals concerned, it is highly unlikely that
135. See, e-g., R. Bigelow, "Transborder Data Flow Barriers" (1979), 20 Jurimetrics J. 8 and
R. MeGuire, "The Information Age: An Introduction to Transborder Data Flow", 20
Jurimetrics J. I.
136. D. McMonagle, "Canada supports computer privacy", Globe and Mai May 23, 1984.
137. The guidelines propose open export of information to those nations which comply with
the guidelines, but not to others.
138. See, eg., E. Grenier, Jr., "Computers and Privacy: A Proposal for Self-Regulation,"
[1970] Duke L.J. 495.
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this would be possible. Data processors do not share a common bond as
do lawyers and medical practitioners and they belong to a fairly young
profession, 3 9 not having had the benefit of centuries of experience during
which to establish themselves and appropriate principles and standards of
behavior.
Attempts have been made, within the industry, to achieve certification
of data-processing professionals, 140 but membership in industry
associations is voluntary and those certifications which do exist are not
universally recognized within the community.' 41
These organizations do represent a positive force in the advancement
of the interests of the public through the development of guidelines such
as those of the Council of the Association for Computing Machinery:
1.1 An A.C.M. member will have proper regard for the health, privacy,
safety and general welfare of the public in the performance of his
professional duties.
1.2 An A.C.M. member will act in professional matters as a faithful agent
or trustee for each employer or client and will not disclose private
information belonging to any present or former employer or client
without his consent.
Unfortunately such statements tend to be "platitudinous"' 42 and have
little bearing on the behavior of the organizations' members. There is no
monitoring and it is debatable whether members are even aware of the
guidelines or code of behavior to which they subscribed when they joined
the organization. At best, attempts at self-regulation can have only a
slight measure of moral persuasion over the members of the profession. 43
5. Screening of Personnel
It is a common practice for most governmental agencies, and some
businesses, to do security clearances on staff who have access to
confidential information and to require that they swear an oath of
139. Computers are still a fairly recent phenomenon having only been introduced during the
early 1950s and not reaching any degree of widespread application until the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
140. Most notably among these efforts are the certification offered to members of the British
Computing Society (limited to British citizens) and the C.D.P. designation awarded upon
successful completion of a comprehensive set of exams offered by the Institute for the
Certification of Computer Professionals (I.C.C.P.).
141. They are generally sought by individuals who lack formal academic credentials within
the field.
142. A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy, supra, note 61 at 255.
143. Unfortunately, like most occupational groups, industry associations are primarily
concerned with advancing the interests of the profession.
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secrecy. 144 However, with the spread of computer systems throughout the
organization, more and more people are given access to greater volumes
of information. It is doubtful that security and screening procedures have
been modified to reflect the changing needs. 145 It is not uncommon to put
full-time staff through rigorous screening yet give unsupervised access to
cleaning staff or service people. Similarly, many organizations make
frequent use of consultants and other contract resources yet do not screen
those individuals. This increased accessibility by unchecked personnel
contributes to a growing erosion of the limited control which does exist.
6. Standards and Education
Many of the problems which arise, and particularly those characterized in
the examples of violations being addressed within this paper, are the
result of the carelessness or inadvertence of the individuals involved. Two
of the most effective means of dealing with these problems are the
establishment of standards and the formulation of educational
programmes to heighten the information processing profession's
awareness of the problem.
While universal standards are desirable, it is unlikely that, short of
legislated enactment, this will occur within the near future. It is therefore
the responsibility of every organization which engages in the processing
of personal information to set and maintain strict standards for the
handling of that information. This may require some measure of internal
policing to ensure that the established policies are being followed.
Considerable time and money is expended in post-secondary
educational institutions and within the internal training programs of
private and public sector organizations to prepare people for the new
technologies. Almost all this training, particularly that aimed at the
technocrats, is geared to the objective of getting the most out of the
available technology. The emphasis which is given to concerns for
security and privacy also tends to focus upon the technology and
invariably pays short shrift to concerns for the privacy of the individual.
7. Conclusion
There is no doubt that changes to the methods and practices of the
information handlers are necessary. But the question of how to best
144. The federal government goes further and fingerprints and does full security checks on
individuals (employees and consultants) who may have access to such information.
145. While many organizations require their staff to swear an oath of secrecy, it is not unusual
to give temporary or agency staff access to the same information with little or no precautions
being taken.
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achieve this result is difficult to answer. We are regulated enough in our
lives that we can no longer afford to look to the passage of more
regulations to handle every situation that arises. But do we really have a
choice?
While the legal process affords some measure of protection, it is often
slow, costly and retrospective in its application. Also, like striking a mule
with a stick to get its attention, its effects are often soon forgotten or new
ways of avoiding the sanction are discovered. Therefore, this approach
must be seen as a means of redressing violations but not as a principal
means of preventing such violations. Other approaches will no doubt be
more suitable in achieving the desired result.
VI. Proposals for Reform
The general conclusion appears to be that the protection of privacy in
Canada is at best sporadic. In the case of disclosure of computer-held
data, and particularly in regard to careless or negligent disclosures, it is
virtually non-existent.
The following proposals are offered as possible ways through which
this situation may be alleviated:
1. Extension of the legislative recognition of a right of privacy throughout
all Canadian provinces and territories;
2. Provision of a more clearly articulated definition of exactly what the
right of privacy protects;146
3. Recognition of a standard (albeit a high standard to safeguard against
vexatious actions) of negligence which would entitle individuals to
redress;
4. Limitations on the use of data to the authorized purposes for which the
data was originally obtained;147
5. Education of the public in regard to their right to withhold
information 48 and their rights to privacy;
146. It is not necessary to enumerate the individual rights, but to define, in reasonably precise
terms, the nature of the rights which warrant protection.
147. For an interesting discussion on the misuse of data for such purposes as mailing lists see
Miller, The Assault on Privacy, supra, note 61 at 80-82.
148. Most people seem quite willing to divulge almost anything they are asked. It is through
the availability of information such as someone's Social Insurance Number that the process of
cross-matching of otherwise unrelated data becomes possible. The only legitimate uses of the
S.I.N. are for the purposes of the administration of the Unemployment Insurance Plan and the
Canada Pension Plan. An individual is within his rights to refuse to divulge this information
to anyone else including other government agencies. Note: Revenue Canada is gradually
adopting the S.I.N. as the prime identifier for personal income tax purposes notwithstanding
that it was not originally intended to be used for this purpose. The Income Tax Act has been
amended to incorporate the use of the S.I.N. as a legitimate purpose (s. 237).
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6. Lessening the power of the collectors of information;149
7. Encouraging the establishment of comprehensive policies and
standards to be adopted and applied by the data handlers;
8. Ensuring that mechanisms, which are employed, apply to all
information, regardless of its form of storage.
Mandatory licencing and registration schemes do not ensure that
privacy is protected. While this approach may be suitable to specific
segments of the industry, 150 any attempt to adopt a blanket application to
all information processing systems would create chaos. No legislated
approach can solve the problem by itself.
By the same token, self-regulation, coupled with internal and industry
standards, may not represent the ideal solution. They must, however,
form a vital part of any overall scheme of information privacy in the
highly computerized society in which we live.
VII. Conclusion
Tlje refusal of Canadian courts to recognize the existence of a common
law right of privacy has vastly limited the scope of protection available
to individuals. The existence, in some provinces, of privacy legislation,
coupled with other available remedies, has somewhat improved the
avenues of redress. It is suggested, however, that this situation is far from
desirable. The lack of consistency among jurisdictions and the limited
protection offered by these schemes leave a large void within which the
potential for abuse is significant.
There has been little movement in the Canadian common law in this
area. One of the few exceptions is the case of Motherwell v.
Motherwel 15' in which the Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed the
granting of an injunction against a woman who was harassing her father,
brother and sister-in-law via telephone. In a very thorough assessment of
the case, the court held that these acts constituted an invasion of privacy.
The court did not go as far as to recognize this as a sui generis actionable
matter. Instead, it held that this invasion was an extension of private
nuisance. 152 Accordingly the judgment was based upon the recognition of
the property rights of the plaintiff-respondents. In fact, the court, although
allowing judgment to the sister-in-law in her own name, wrested with the
149. Due to the unequal bargaining power they hold, landlords, credit grantors, employers
and even governmental agencies tend to request and receive, from the public, considerable
information which is not essential to their purposes.
150. Such as the credit-reporting industry, discussed supra.
151. (1977), 1 A.R. 47; 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (C.A.).
152. (1977), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62 at 67.
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problem that the property in question was that of her husband. On this
basis, it would appear that this judicial recognition of a right of privacy
is quite limited in its future application.
With regard to the possible protection against negligent invasion of
privacy, particularly through the misapplication of data-processing
technology, we are a long way from realizing even a minimal level. This
problem can only be overcome through the education of the public and
potential violators to the inherent dangers associated with certain current
practices. Without this awareness, the chances of success are quite
limited.
Before we formulate new or changed methods of dealing with this
situation it is important that we first assess one major factor - whether
or not this is a right worthy of protection. If society's answer to this
question is in the negative, then no further discussion is necessary.
However, if we collectively respond positively, we are faced with further
questions which must be answered, including the extent to which we are
prepared to do so. From these starting points, it will be possible to
formulate a comprehensive plan for the accomplishment of the identified
objectives.
It must be noted, in closing, that protection against disclosure of
confidential information is important in relation to information stored or
handled in all forms. This paper has focused upon the use of computer
systems in handling personal information. The reader must recognize that
all the principles addressed within this paper should be equally applicable
to all sources of information. It is submitted that the amendments to the
Criminal Code (ss. 301.2 and 387), which created new offences, are too
narrow. They should, in this writer's view, address all information, not
only machine-processable information.
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